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abstract
The issue of time-awareness presents a critical challenge for empiricism: if 
temporal properties are not directly perceived, how do we become aware of them? 
A unique empiricist account of time-awareness suggested by Hume’s comments 
on time in the Treatise avoids the problems characteristic of other empiricist 
accounts. Hume’s theory, however, has some counter-intuitive consequences. The 
failure of empiricists to come up with a defensible theory of time-awareness lends 
prima facie support to a non-empiricist theory of ideas.
introduction
St. Augustine’s central theses about time – namely, that the past and future do not 
exist and that the present does not have duration – imply that temporal properties 
like duration, succession, and time-order are not directly perceived. Augustine 
puzzles over how he can assess the length of time taken up by a movement or a 
noise, if he has no direct perceptual awareness of any part of the process other than 
that occurring at the present moment (Augustine, Confessions, 1961, 11.26–8). He 
replies that he can retain the idea of a process of particular duration, and use it as a 
“standard of measurement.” But he notes that it cannot literally be the process that 
is the standard of measurement, since it is no longer present. Instead one meas-
ures duration by reference to a represented benchmark fi xed in one’s memory. A 
notion of the passage of time is achieved by recollecting past mental contents and 
comparing them to present ones. The parts of the mental representation of a dura-
tion stand for elapsed parts of a process being measured.
This story takes one important fact for granted. My mental states could only 
serve to represent duration in this way if I already have the concept of duration, or 
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at least some other temporal concept like succession from which the idea of dura-
tion could be derived. No mental representation has temporal content in itself; if 
Augustine is right in saying that only the present moment is directly perceived, 
then his mental affections are just states with the mere potential to be employed 
as stand-ins for duration and passage. If we do not have a direct awareness of 
anything outside the present moment, and we are not to conclude that our idea of 
time is a priori, then we must come up with an account of the experiential origin 
of temporal concepts like duration and succession. C.K. Mundle describes the 
problem for the empiricist who accepts Augustine’s two theses about time:
[W]hatever relations may hold between the images (or between the images and 
the sensa or percepts) which a person has at any durationless instant, the rela-
tion of temporal precedence cannot be among them, for this relation holds, by 
defi nition, between items which are not simultaneous. The would-be empiricist 
would thus have debarred himself from saying what he wants and needs to say, 
i.e., that our temporal concepts are constructed from (can be defi ned in terms 
of) temporal relations like earlier than which are sense-given (can be osten-
sively identifi ed). (Mundle, 1966, p. 166)1
The empiricist, characteristically, maintains the truth of the principle that all 
simple ideas must be derived from original sense-impressions, or from impres-
sions of refl ection upon the mind’s own contents or operations (the ‘copy prin-
ciple’).2 (Treatise 1.1.1; 4) All complex ideas are derived from sensation, from a 
combination of simple ideas, or from refl ection. Hence the problem of time for 
empiricism: how are concepts like duration or succession derived from sensation 
or refl ection? This problem was taken up by empiricists such as Locke, James, 
Russell, and Broad (as discussed in Mundle, 1966). Locke’s failure to give a satis-
factory account of how these concepts could be derived from sense-experience is 
instructive. He holds that we have a direct, refl ective perception of the succession 
of our ideas: we gain the idea of succession simply by refl ecting on the train of 
ideas as it passes through our mind (Locke, 1975, p. 182). The idea of duration, 
in turn, is just the idea of the distance (measured by number of elapsed ideas) 
between any two of our ideas.
This account is not satisfactory. In order actually to have a direct perception of 
a succession, I would have to perceive, all at once, a temporally-extended series. 
But for Locke, our ideas come to us, as it were, one by one. At any given moment, 
I have only one idea before me (or, perhaps, several simultaneous ones). The 
succession of my ideas is never truly before me at a time. (This is pointed out by 
Sean Kelly (Kelly, unpublished)). Even if I simultaneously recollect past ideas, 
and refl ect on them together with my present idea(s), the content of my current 
mental state is not that of a succession; it is that of a set of ideas held simultane-
ously, some of which happen to be products of mental reproduction, and some 
of which happen to be products of present perception. In his account of memory, 
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Locke just describes the mind’s power to reproduce perceptions together with a 
perception that one “has had them before” (Locke, p. 150). But the origin of this 
sense of ‘beforeness’ is a mystery. I could interpret some of my currently-held 
ideas as reproductions, and thus the whole set as a succession, but only if I already 
had a sense of what it is for something to be a reproduction. Without an idea of 
time already in play, there can be no awareness of succession among a set of ideas 
refl ected upon at a time.
Locke’s failure to explain time-concepts, and the resulting perceived inability 
of empiricists to account for time-concepts, is extremely important because this 
inability is the foundation of Kant’s argument for the role of a priori concepts in 
cognition and the consequent possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge. In his 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that time is best understood as a form of 
experience: we are constructed so as to experience events and our own mental states 
successively. However, as Kant intimates, successions of perceptions and enduring 
perceptions are not by themselves, respectively, representations of succession or 
duration (Kant, 1998, pp. 228–9 and 300 (A99 and B225)). He argues that aware-
ness of a succession as such requires the formal concept of an objective world, 
spelled out in terms of time and space. Thus the elements making up this concept 
of an objective world – including, he argues, the concepts of substance and cause 
– must be a priori. Since coherent experience requires that we organize experience 
according to such concepts, we can say that we are entitled to apply them to expe-
rience. This is the essence of Kant’s answer to empiricist skepticism.
In defense of an empiricist theory of time-awareness, Bertrand Russell main-
tained that, at any given moment, what we directly experience is a stretch of time. 
Russell’s view was that a sense-organ, when stimulated, “goes on vibrating, like a 
piano string” for a while after the stimulation (Russell, 1927, p. 205). In the period 
during which the sensation fades, we literally perceive now what happened a short 
while ago. It is because of this effect that we see, for example, the movement of a 
second-hand: we can see a second-hand moving because we literally see it, at one 
moment, in several places.
H.J. Paton argued in response that, even if it were true that we could sense at 
a moment several different positions of the second-hand of a watch, the simulta-
neous perception of these positions would not be a perception of movement but 
of something else:
if in a moment I can sense several different positions of a second hand, then 
these different positions would be sensed as being all at the same moment. 
That is to say what I should sense would not be a movement, but a stationary 
fan covering a certain area, and perhaps getting gradually brighter towards one 
end. Anything else would surely be a miracle. You can’t see a sensum that isn’t 
there. If you see it, it is there at the time you see it. (Paton, 1929, p. 320)3
Experiencing the temporally-diverse parts of a temporally-extended process all 
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at once does not count as having a direct experience of a process any more than 
experiencing a current part of a process while recollecting past components of the 
process. (See Mundle, 1966. This point is also discussed in Kelly, unpublished.)
C.D. Broad responded to this criticism by arguing that there is an aspect of how 
mental contents are intended he called “presentedness” (Broad, 1938, p. 282. Cf. 
also Odegard, 1978, p. 117). The later parts of a perceived duration, he claimed, 
have a greater degree of this quality. This is what gives us the experience of motion 
as opposed to a “stationary fan.” Douglas Odegard replies that, if this just means 
that the later parts of the process are presented more vividly than the earlier parts, 
then nothing is communicated about the temporal status of the perceived parts 
(Odegard, p. 117). Perhaps for this reason Broad conceded that the introduction 
of the presentedness quality appears to be a “verbal trick” for dealing with Paton’s 
objection (Broad, p. 282).
According to the Augustinian presumptions, we only know the past by virtue 
of something standing in for it now, and anything standing in for what happened 
in the past needs to be interpreted as communicating temporal information (Cf. 
Guyer, 1987, pp. 302–3). But whether what is being so interpreted is a mental 
representation of elapsed duration, a recollected idea, a sensation that is the result 
of reverberating sense-organs, or a degree of presentedness, an interpretation in 
terms of time is required. And no such interpretation can take place without the 
application of temporal concepts.
Mundle’s answer involves rejecting the Augustinian problem for time-aware-
ness. He agrees that Paton’s criticism of Russell is valid. However, he thinks the 
empiricist has no genuine problem with time-awareness stemming from that puzzle 
because one of Augustine’s theses is false: namely, that the present of observation 
has no duration. He points out that most would agree that “sensa” (individual 
sensation-events) have duration: because infi nitesimal periods of sensory input 
cannot be sensed, events of observation take time to occur. Thus the length of 
time taken up by a perceptual event is not infi nitesimal, but rather incorporates 
a period of sensory input that itself can include a change in content. The present 
of perception, then, is an extended period of time. It follows, he claims, that we 
can say that we can experience succession in one perceptual act, and so we sense 
temporal relations:
If we use sensum-language, we are free to adopt rules which will allow empiri-
cists to say what they need to say, i.e., that temporal relations (precedence, 
overlapping, etc.) hold between different sensa and between different states of 
the same sensa, that these relations are sense-given. (Mundle, p. 168)
Mundle must be defi ning the ‘present’ of perception as the span of time coex-
tensive with a temporally-extended sensation-event. Otherwise, we would have 
another ‘Paton miracle’ on our hands: namely, the direct, present sensation of past 
events. Because he thinks that perceptions are themselves temporally extended, he 
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also thinks we can embrace, in one perceptual act, a change in sensation.
Extended, single acts of awareness are what proponents of a “specious present” 
of perception have suggested, some even citing, in an attempt to establish the 
length of the specious present, empirical studies concerning the span of time with 
a length that is accurately estimable, or that is accessible to short-term memory 
without error (Mabbott, 1967). Spatial perception can encompass more than one 
minimum in one momentary act of awareness; why not temporal perception in 
one extended act? But, as J.D. Mabbott has pointed out, if both acts of awareness 
and their objects were extended in time, it would be impossible to assign contents 
to those acts of awareness (Mabbott, pp. 310–11). For any event-span supposedly 
directly ‘given’ over the course of an extended act of awareness, part of what 
is thereby directly given to part of the act will not be given to another part. But 
then there is no event the act of awareness could apprehend as a whole. Mabbott 
concludes that “the doctrine of the specious present is untenable and sheds no light 
on our normal apprehension of temporal events.”
hume on the origin of temporal concepts
To the extent that they accepted Augustine’s premises, each of the later defenders 
of empiricism faced a seemingly insurmountable conundrum in trying to account 
for temporal concepts: on the one hand, we need to form temporal concepts from 
materials we have at hand at a given moment; on the other, to think of such materials 
as representing duration or succession it seems we must deploy temporal concepts 
(cf. Kelly, forthcoming). So where do these concepts come from? Hume’s funda-
mentally different approach to the problem has received relatively little attention, 
yet, interestingly, suggests an account of time-awareness that avoids the circularity 
problem to which many empiricist accounts are subject. It bears closer examina-
tion for this reason, though in the end there are serious concerns as to its coherence 
and plausibility.
In his Treatise of Human Nature Hume rejects the infi nite divisibility of space 
and time, and argues that the ideas of empty space and empty time are incoherent. 
He proposes that impressions of spaces and times are composed of indivisible parts 
he calls perceptual “minima,” and that ideas of spaces and times are composed of 
corresponding ideas. He defi nes perceptual minima as the minimum perceivable 
qualitative units of sense-experience. An example he gives is the simple idea of 
color generated by the perception of a spot of ink at the limit of its perceivability 
(Treatise 1975, 1.2.1; 27). The spot of ink any farther away would be impercep-
tible. Any closer and the impression of it would be divisible into smaller impres-
sions. For him, then, the impression and the corresponding idea of the spot are 
simple, with color but no divisible extension.
Hume’s next task is to ask from whence the idea of time derives, given his view 
JSP5_1_04_Bardon.indd   51 5/12/06   12:45:59
Adrian Bardon
52
that all simple ideas derive from simple impressions of sensation or refl ection, and 
any complex ideas must be traceable to these. His account of the origin of the idea 
of temporal succession runs as follows:
The idea of time is not deriv’d from a particular impression mix’d up with 
others, and plainly distinguishable from them; but arises altogether from the 
manner, in which impressions appear to the mind, without making one of the 
number. Five notes play’d on a fl ute give us the impression and idea of time; 
tho’ time be not a sixth impression, which presents itself to the hearing or any 
other of the senses. Nor is it a sixth impression, which the mind by refl ection 
fi nds in itself. … [H]ere [the mind] only takes notice of the manner, in which 
the different sounds make their appearance; and that it may afterwards consider 
without considering these particular sounds, but may conjoin it with any other 
objects. (Treatise, 1.2.3; 36–7)
We have no distinct sensory impression of time in itself. Since the minimal units 
of sensation are themselves indivisible and momentary, duration is not a qualita-
tive aspect of sensation (Treatise 1.2.3; 37) (See Falkenstein, 1997, p. 184). In 
fact, no notion of times independent of changing perceptions or events is even 
conceivable, according to Hume: the idea of an extended period of time is derived 
from the experience of a succession of impressions, and has no application in the 
absence of any succession.4
Neither is the idea of time derived from impressions of refl ection, in that there 
are no single impressions of refl ection of which ideas of times are ideas. Hume 
does say elsewhere that memories are distinguished from products of imagination 
by their force and vivacity, and that newer memories tend to be “clearer” than older 
ones (Treatise, 1.3.5; 85). But this is never put forward as a rule (see Falkenstein, 
1997 p. 186). And this vivacity, or clarity, itself is not the impression of time.5
So what explains our idea of time? For Hume, our ideas of particular time-inter-
vals come fi rst. Our ideas of times are said by Hume to derive not from a separate 
impression of the duration of an event, but from the very disposition, the very 
manner of the appearance, of the successive momentary impressions making up 
the compound impression of the event.6 On Hume’s view our experience primor-
dially consists of collections of simple impressions. But any collection of simple 
impressions must be a collection of “simple impressions disposed in a certain 
manner” (Falkenstein, 1997, pp. 188–9). The manner of disposition of the parts of 
our experience in time, as Hume stresses, is an aspect of all our experience, both 
sensory and refl ective (Treatise, 1.2.3; 34–5) As Lorne Falkenstein has recently 
pointed out, many interpreters of Hume have rebelled against this proposal, 
because it seems to violate the dictum that the contents of all ideas are traceable to 
original simple impressions (Falkenstein, pp. 180–1). For this reason some Hume 
scholars, including Robert Fogelin and B.M. Laing, have sought to interpret the 
Treatise in such a way that Hume is found to derive the ideas of space and time 
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from impressions thereof (Cf. Falkenstein, pp. 183–5). But Falkenstein replies that 
the manners of disposition of our impressions are present in compound impres-
sions, and it is not a violation of empiricist principles to allow ideas copying these 
manners of disposition (Falkenstein, p. 182; see also Garrett, 1997, pp. 52–7). For 
Hume, “our ideas of particular (bounded and sensibly qualifi ed) spatiotemporal 
intervals are direct copies, not just of simple impressions, but of simple impres-
sions disposed in a certain manner” (Falkenstein, p. 182). Ideas of manners of 
disposition, then, do not go beyond what is “directly and immediately given in 
sensory experience,” even though they do go beyond what is directly given in any 
particular simple impression (Ibid. p. 190).7
On this account, the ideas of space and time in general (as opposed to particular 
space- and time-intervals) are abstract ideas, arrived at by “distinction of reason.” 
(See Tweyman, 1974; also Garrett 1997, for a good exposition of Hume’s theory 
of abstract ideas.) On the above reading, we gain ideas of particular extensions 
and durations simply by experiencing the manner in which our simple impressions 
are arrayed in space and time; by focusing, through a distinction of reason, on the 
feature of these manners of disposition that they have in common, the mind is 
spurred by the respect in which they resemble each other to take a particular idea 
and treat it as representative of a class.8 The problem of time-awareness under 
consideration concerns the origin of ideas of succession and duration in experi-
ence. Since abstract ideas, for Hume, are really ideas of particulars, the main issue 
in explaining the origin of the idea of time becomes the origin of ideas of particular 
times. His answer is that ideas of particular temporal intervals derive from the 
experience of manners of successive disposition of impressions. He describes the 
idea of time without a changeable object, just like the idea of empty space, as a 
“fi ction,” that we only “fancy we have” (Treatise, 1.2.3; 37, T 1.2.5; 65). But this 
is by contrast to the idea of time derived from an experience of a succession. This 
contrast shows he took the idea of a temporal interval to be a real idea.
The challenges for this Humean view can be best understood in the context of a 
criticism by M.R. Annand (as discussed by Falkenstein, 1997, pp. 193–6). Annand 
made the Kantian charge that Hume cannot account for how we get from a succes-
sion of perceptions to a representation of succession (Annand, 1930). This is the 
same problem, essentially, as the one faced by the other defenders of empiricism: 
the mere fact that a change in perceptions has taken place does not seem to amount 
to the experience of a change without a further temporal interpretation of one’s 
present mental contents.
The solution suggested by Hume’s comments is to collapse the  distinction 
be tween a succession of perceptions and a representation of succession, by com -
bining his point about copying manners of disposition with a principle according 
to which ideas represent by duplicating the qualities of their object.
Hume describes ideas as “images” and “copies” of impressions and outer 
objects, and states that ideas “resemble” those things they represent. (Cf. Treatise 
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1.1.1; 1, T 1.2.5; 63, T 1.3.1; 72, T 1.4.5; 232–3. See Anderson, 1976, p. 163.) 
Following Robert Anderson (Anderson, 1976), Falkenstein argues that Hume 
has a theory of mental representation stating that our perceptions of outer things 
are mental objects representing those outer things via qualitative resemblance. A 
literal interpretation of the copy principle suggests that, for an idea to represent 
either an impression or a real object, the idea must resemble that which is repre-
sented. “[H]ow can an impression represent a substance,” Hume asks, “otherwise 
than by resembling it?” (Treatise 1.4.5; 233). This Falkenstein terms the “likeness 
principle” (Falkenstein, 1995, p. 28). Hume’s view, he says, is that perception 
“supplies us with a direct acquaintance with ‘refl ective images’ that represent 
external objects to us in the way the image of a mountain refl ected in a lake repre-
sents the mountain … the way these images represent external objects is by a 
literal picturing that involves a quality-for-quality correspondence” (Falkenstein, 
2002, p. 29). Thus impressions and ideas represent their object literally by copying 
them – by duplicating their qualities:
When Hume’s own account of what it means for an idea to represent an object 
is taken into account, the distinction between an ordered series of perceptions 
and the perception of an ordered series collapses … Hume does not take an idea 
to be an act whereby a mind thinks of or intends a particular object (in this case, 
a relation of adjacency in space or succession in time). Instead, he takes ideas 
to be objects in their own right, that represent something else by resembling 
it. An idea of space represents space by being itself extended in space, not by 
being ‘of’ space; an idea of time represents time by enduring over time. … [T]o 
have an idea of succession is to have an idea that takes time to occur, and over 
which a number of parts occur successively. … Annand’s distinction between 
a succession of perceptions and a perception of succession is therefore one that 
Hume would reject. Ultimately, our ‘perceptions of succession’ just are ideas 
that represent the fact of succession by containing two parts, one of which is 
represented prior to the other over the time that the idea takes to occur. In other 
words, our perceptions of succession are ultimately no more than successions 
of ideas. (Falkenstein, 1997, pp. 193–5)
In support of this interpretation, Falkenstein cites Hume’s description of a percep-
tion having parts that are arranged in space:
That table, which just now appears to me, is only a perception, and all its quali-
ties are qualities of a perception. Now the most obvious of all its qualities is 
extension. The perception consists of parts. These parts are so situated, as to 
afford us the notion of distance and contiguity; of length, breadth, and thick-
ness. … And to cut short all disputes, the very idea of extension is copy’d from 
nothing but an impression, and consequently must perfectly agree to it. To say 
the idea of extension agrees to any thing, is to say it is extended. (Treatise 1.4.5; 
239–40, emphasis added)
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There are a number of passages in the Treatise where Hume says that ideas are 
extended in space and have location. He describes ideas as extended in the brain, 
and he insists that some ideas can be relatively large or small (Treatise, 2.2.8; 372, 
T 1.2.1; 28). (See Anderson, 1980.) He also explains that the mind excites ideas 
when it “dispatches the spirits into that region of the brain, in which the idea is 
placed” (Treatise 1.2.5; 60–1).9
According to this reading, Hume does not need to explain how to represent a 
succession of perceptions as a succession: owing to his application of the likeness 
principle to manners of disposition, whenever one undergoes any succession of 
perceptions, one ipso facto has a representation of succession. Hume avoids the 
Augustinian problem by showing that our awareness of time does not happen at 
a moment and originate in the interpretation of recollected content or reverbera-
tions, but rather is an extended sequence of impressions. For Augustine and Locke, 
by contrast, the past can be an object of thought only by virtue of memory. Russell 
and Broad tried to solve the problem by claiming that we are able directly to sense 
the past at the present moment, but they were not able to account for the percep-
tion of motion or change. The Humean theory that ideas of successions are copies 
of the temporal arrangement of the parts of successions of impressions treats all 
parts of a succession – past and present – equally as contributing to an idea of the 
succession. Parts of the idea are distinguished from each other as being earlier 
and later, but are not distinguished from each other as being products of memory 
vs. products of current perception.10 Unlike Mundle, however, Hume’s proposal 
under the likeness principle is that the awareness of a succession is fundamentally 
composed of a series of awarenesses appropriately related to each other, rather 
than a single, temporally-extended awareness. Thus Mabbott’s concern that the 
parts of a single, temporally-extended awareness cannot share an object of aware-
ness does not apply.
awareness of successive parts and awareness of succession
There are, however, troubling questions to be considered with regard to the 
Humean theory described above. First, there is Hume’s inherent rejection of 
Augustine’s ‘presentism’. Hume’s account implies we cannot discount our access 
to previous parts of an experience of a succession as any less accessible (i.e., 
accessible merely to recollection) than the present moment. This seems problem-
atic owing to the intuitive diffi culty posed by the notion of the past (or future) 
existing just as the present does, which would seem to be a prerequisite for succes-
sion being a possible object of direct awareness. There is an extensive literature on 
“presentism” (the doctrine, embraced by Augustine, that only the present exists) 
and its opponents, which is much too vast to be dealt with here.11 However, in 
addition to the other questions raised above against the Humean approach to time-
awareness, a defender of that approach must show that the position that past events 
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exist in just the same way as present ones do is acceptable, despite (admittedly 
debatable) commonsense intuitions to the contrary. Otherwise, we cannot identify 
each act of awareness over a stretch of time as real. Unless the past exists, part of 
that overall experience will no longer be real; and if awareness is actual only now, 
then the sense in which an awareness of the past persists must make reference to 
retention, rather than to direct awareness. Further, it is one thing to say the past 
exists and another to say that we can have direct awareness of it. Even if we reject 
Augustine’s presentism, the defender of the Humean approach under considera-
tion must offer a coherent view according to which a whole succession can be an 
object of direct awareness.
My second point has to do with identifying the time of the idea of succession. 
Keep in mind that we are not talking about the reconstruction of a succession after 
the fact. Hume is accounting for the experience – the generation of the idea of – a 
succession or process as it occurs. He claims we glean the idea of a succession 
from a sequence of perceptions – that there is no distinction between a succession 
of perceptions and a perception of succession. Recall that he reifi es experience 
by temporal minima; but take any experienced succession of temporal perceptual 
minima, located, respectively, at moments t1 – tn: the account under consideration 
implies that there is a series of experiences taking place from t1 – tn (distinguish-
able by the minima they are experiences of), and a single experience, the direct 
object of which is the entire succession. So what am I observing now, at the present 
moment (say, at some moment tm, between t1 and tn) – the minimal impression or 
event that is happening now, or an entire extended succession of impressions or 
events? The notion of such a consciousness implies that there is no answer to the 
question, when one is in the grips of such an experience, as to what idea one has 
at any given moment. There is the component-perception of the moment, but the 
experience or idea that is the object of this consciousness ‘belongs’ to the entire 
extended time of the experience, and is not ascribable to the subject of the expe-
rience at any particular time. Can the notion of an observation-event have any 
meaning if we are not talking about what is observed at a time?12 Take time tm as 
described above, and call the idea of the manner of disposition of the experiences 
at t1–tn idea Ω. At tm I exist (or, as Hume might put it, a bundle of ideas β exists), 
and I have some ideas at tm and don’t have others (or some ideas belong to β at tm 
and some don’t). Do I have Ω at tm or don’t I? (Does Ω belong to β at tm or doesn’t 
it?) It seems that there should be a defi nite answer to this question, but on the 
account of experience under consideration there is none.
There are many ways one could defi ne the “present” in the context of “present 
experience” (Lacey, 1968, pp. 241–2). Augustine himself notes that we can perfectly 
well talk about the “present” day, month, or century, but adds that this convention 
does not imply anything about the reality of the past or future (Confessions 11:15). 
It is possible, of course, to say one is currently enjoying a symphony, but this does 
not mean that one is at this time exposed to more than the notes being played right 
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about now; there are penumbral uses of the term ‘experience’ that allow extended 
objects of observation, just as there are uses of the term “present” that encompass 
extended units of time. Hume argues against the infi nite divisibility of time, but his 
temporal minima by defi nition do not encompass changes in perceptual content. 
To think in terms of extended experience is to say that one has the experience of a 
succession over the whole time during which the succession occurs, but not at any 
point during that period. It seems the only way to allow for extended experience 
like this is to abandon the notion of a ‘now’ of experience. But by dividing all 
experience into distinguishable minimal perceptions lacking divisible extension in 
time, Hume has seemingly answered the question of what constitutes the present. 
One would think the answer to what one is experiencing now, or what ideas one 
has now, could naturally be answered by reference to those.13
Consider also the related issue of circumscribing observation-events. If any 
extended experience of any succession counted as a single experience of that 
succession, one’s experience of the manner of disposition of a set of event-parts 
would count as a direct observation, even if the impressions of some of those 
event-parts took place hours ago. Certainly one may have directly observed the 
hour-old parts of an hour-long sequence an hour ago, and subsequently the rest 
of it as well. So in that sense one can execute an hour-long direct observation of 
an hour-long sequence. But on the Humean account this ‘extended’ observation 
would really be constituted by a series of temporal minima, and thus by a series 
of distinct observations. So this answer calls for some principled way to reify 
extended observations. Hume can’t circumscribe the experience of a manner of 
disposition by unity of content (i.e., circumscribe individual experiences such that 
any change in input means a different experience), since it is precisely the single 
and direct observation of a change in content that is supposed, on this view, to give 
us the idea of a succession. So if this account is going to work, observations must 
be distinguished in some other way.
Suppose, however, that observation-events including direct awareness of tempo-
rally-extended periods can be defensibly circumscribed. One might suggest that 
the experience of a succession is limited by some brute fact about human abilities: 
just as there is a contingent natural limit, owing to limits on visual perception, to 
the region of space we can be aware of, there is a limit to what span of time we 
can be aware of.14 And this determines the extent of the experience of a manner of 
temporal disposition. But this leaves the last, and perhaps fundamental objection 
to identifying an idea of succession with a succession of ideas. Hume’s position 
appears to be that the consciousness of a succession somehow just is the mere 
occurrence of a series of states individually refl ecting the parts of the succession. 
The reason why this suggestion might be viewed as a non-starter has to do with 
the Kantian critique of Hume on the unity of consciousness and the possibility of 
judgment. Hume denies mental substance, and does not seem to recognize any 
need for the presupposition of one in judgment. His denial implies the notion of 
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ideas that represent just by their qualities, versus representing by virtue of how we 
as subjects of experience read the contents of our ideas. Kant points out that this 
would not explain the possibility of the bringing together of diverse representa-
tions in judgment. In particular, it is central to his position that the mere occur-
rence of a series of states that individually mirror the parts of a succession cannot 
give rise to the idea of a succession. The mere occurrence of a sequence of states 
bearing certain relations to each other doesn’t tell us anything about how these 
states should be combined in judgment. For one thing, these states need to be, at a 
minimum, presumed to all be one’s own states, and Hume notoriously can explain 
neither this phenomenon nor the content of the thought of a persisting self. Kant 
also argues convincingly that, since a succession of perceptions can be variously 
interpreted as resulting from the replacement of one item with another, or the 
result of changing perspectives on a static state of affairs as opposed to a process, 
concepts like substance and cause must be in play as a necessary condition of 
making any judgment one way or the other. (See Bardon, 2002.) Thus his conclu-
sion that the mere occurrence of a series of awarenesses of parts of a succession 
cannot amount to a judgment regarding the occurrence of a succession.
duration and temporal disposition
One possibility worth considering is that Hume thought these problems do not 
arise because of the timelessness, on his view, of “steadfast” perceptions. In his 
discussion of time in the Treatise, Hume claims that we only represent time by 
imagining a succession of changing objects or perceptions (Treatise, 1.2.5; 65).15 
It is certain, he says, that we have no idea of time (i.e., duration) without any 
changeable existence: there is no impression from which it would be derived. 
Therefore the idea of duration only applies to, or is derived from, successions, and 
unchanging (“steadfast”) perceptions are really durationless. He explains how we 
come to the mistaken conclusion that the notion of duration applies to something 
unchanging:
we may observe, that there is a continual succession of perceptions in our mind; 
so that the idea of time being ever present for us; when we consider a steadfast 
object at fi ve-a-clock, and regard the same at six; we are apt to apply to it that 
idea in the same manner as if every moment were distingush’d by a different 
position, or an alteration of the object. (Treatise, 1.2.5; 65)
We tend to think of the unchanging perception or object in question as one that 
could have changed (but did not) in the time period marked off by the succession. 
But the passage of time really only properly applies in the case of change. This 
claim implies the apparently contradictory result that it is possible for a single, 
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indivisible moment to coexist with a succession of moments. I shall call this the 
‘coexistence problem.’ Don Baxter argues that it was Hume’s view that our expe-
rience of time is composed of various successions of perceptions, which we then 
associate with each other temporally by virtue of perceived relations of contiguity, 
resemblance, and causation (Baxter, 2001). Moments, Baxter explains, for Hume 
are abstractions from members of successions, and some moments are abstractions 
from steadfast perceptions (Baxter, p. 135). Further, since only spatial minima are 
in space, no moment is in more than one place. There is no meaning, on Hume’s 
view, to the notion of an objective time-order according to which all successions 
and their parts can be related to each other on a single timeline; rather, for Hume, 
“there are different successions of intervals in different places, with no subinter-
vals in common.” The passage of time is local, and any single, ‘universal’ timeline 
is a psychological construct. In this way, steadfast perceptions, only erroneously 
ascribed duration, can coexist with other perceptions undergoing duration. The 
coexistence problem only arises if “we assume that time is like a line and so if an 
interval coexists with a succession of intervals, then the latter intervals are subin-
tervals of the former” (Baxter, p. 134).
If a unitary moment of perception can coexist with a succession of percep-
tions, then Hume might be thinking of our awareness of the manner of disposition 
of a succession of notes as a kind of unitary, timeless experience that coexists 
with that succession. Hume’s description of a steadfast object is of an object or 
perception that does not change, and a perception of a succession is certainly 
not steadfast. Yet, as is clear in the fl ute comment, he did treat awarenesses of 
temporally complex manners of disposition as unitary experiences of a sort. The 
manner of disposition of a succession of perceptions, being determined by the 
pattern of changing perceptions itself, does not itself change with the changing 
perceptions. That suggests he could have embraced the notion that the experience 
of the manner of disposition of a succession is a kind of single, steadfast – and 
thus timeless – experience. This would make sense of the seemingly contradictory 
claims that the experience of the manner of disposition of successive perceptions 
(a) coexists with a series of perceptions (of the component parts) and (b) is also 
a unitary experience. Further, if such an experience counts as both unitary and 
timeless, then Hume need not allow that the experience of a successive manner of 
disposition is constructed from memory; nor would he need to acknowledge ques-
tions as to what point in the succession the idea is formed, or how an extended 
act of awareness can encompass an extended event as a whole, or how the elapsed 
portions of an act of awareness can have the same status vis-à-vis observation as 
the present portion.
There is one critical objection to the proposal that the experience of a manner of 
disposition is a kind of steadfast and timeless perception: this proposal would not 
allow for the answer Baxter gleans from Hume regarding the coexistence problem. 
Hume’s answer, he claims, is that we register different successions (and thus 
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different moments) as taking place in different locations, with no direct temporal 
correspondence between them. We construct an overall timeline from perceived 
relations between successions. But this solution to the coexistence problem would 
not work in the case of the coexistence of successive perceptions with duration-
less experiences of the manners of disposition of those same successive percep-
tions: the succession and its manner of disposition in such a case would not be 
represented as occurring at different places, and so the succession and its manner 
of disposition would not be associated by virtue of contiguity, causation, or any 
other psychological spur. The manner of disposition of the succession is not only 
local but essentially an aspect of the very same succession. There would be no 
way to understand the moments abstracted from the successive perceptions and 
the supposedly durationless moment abstracted from the whole succession except 
as coexisting in the same time-frame, which would result in the contradiction that 
defi nes the coexistence problem.16
A theory of time-awareness taking ideas and impressions to be copies of what 
they represent, including the manners of disposition of the component parts of 
what ideas of succession represent, thus seems to work either by circularly presup-
posing temporal concepts, by equivocating on the notion of the perceptual present, 
or by unworkably eliminating that notion altogether. Further, under an interpreta-
tion of Hume that answers these concerns by taking experiences of manners of 
disposition to be durationless, there is no obvious way to solve the coexistence 
problem that arises.
So for now it seems that no empiricist theory successfully accounts for temporal 
concepts.17 As long as we agree that temporal concepts are necessary to coherent 
experience of the world around us and our own thoughts, and that we cannot 
account for temporal concepts by reference to experience, then we need to take 
seriously the possibility of a priori elements in cognition.18
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 1 Mundle’s concerns clearly are equally applicable to the concept of duration.
 2 As Lorne Falkenstein points out, an empiricist who is not a realist about sensible quali-
ties must say that our ideas of such qualities are occasioned by certain sorts of sense-
 perception, rather than caused by perceptions of such qualities. See Falkenstein, 2004, p. 
157.
 3 One can presently sense past events in that there are time-delays attributable to the fi nite 
speeds of light and sound; but this is not what Russell has in mind.
 4 Alexander Rosenberg argues that Hume’s account is circular, in that the concept of time 
depends on the notion of a succession of impressions, which in turn refers to the notion 
of succession in time (Rosenberg, 1993, p. 83). Time, therefore, cannot be identifi ed with 
a manner of disposition, and similarly for space. I think that this objection just gets at 
the primitiveness of spatial and temporal relations, be they relations between perceptual 
minima or between objects and events. I think that Hume would agree that we can only 
characterize the manners of disposition or appearance of minima spatially and tempo-
rally, and so this kind of “circularity” is inevitable. A “God’s eye” characterization of 
how the world is independent of spatial and temporal relations is beyond us, since we 
could have no corresponding impression.
 5 For reasons discussed earlier with regard to Broad’s presentedness quality, neither could 
the relative vivacity or clarity of memories, even if reliably correlated with age, be the 
source of the idea of time by virtue of inference: in order to associate vivacity with age, 
we would have to already possess a concept of age.
 6 Hume sometimes seems to use “disposition” specifi cally for arrangement in space (e.g., 
Treatise 1.2.3; 35), but he also refers to successiveness in time at least once as a species 
of disposition (Treatise 1.2.3; 37). Since his treatments of space and time were clearly 
intended to be parallel, I shall refer to arrangements of impressions or ideas in time as a 
“manner of disposition.”
 7 Marina Frasca-Spada, like Falkenstein, sees the origin of the ideas of space and time 
for Hume in the manner of the appearance of spatial and temporal minima, but sees this 
phenomenon as an exception to the copy principle, rather than as consistent with it. See 
Frasca-Spada, 1998, pp. 59–65.
 8 As with other abstract ideas like cause, their origin in mere psychological propensities of 
mind did not stop Hume from making full use of them in his own theories. In the Treatise 
Hume identifi es a number of abstract ideas (like cause, for example) that he argues do 
not have the origin or content we may have thought they did, but this makes him all the 
more concerned to explain their origin in experience (and in so doing better explain their 
content). The derivative status of space and time as mere abstract ideas does not distin-
guish them from any other general concepts for Hume. Wayne Waxman argues that, for 
Hume, abstract ideas are not ideas at all (Waxman, 1994, p. 100), but as he concedes (p. 
101) this does not stop Hume from using abstract language all the time.
 9 The likeness principle has some curious consequences with regard to the physical prop-
erties of ideas. This principle implies that ideas may not only be extended in space and 
distended in time, but also loud, colored, hard, and smelly. John Yolton goes so far as 
to take Hume’s comments implying the likeness principle to be satirical (Yolton, 1980). 
Falkenstein clearly has some sympathy for this doctrine: while he thinks there are prob-
lems with Hume’s theory of perception, he thinks it is not clearly the case that Hume 
makes a category mistake in ascribing spatial extension and other physical properties to 
impressions and ideas. Falkenstein, 1997, pp. 191ff, and Falkenstein, 2002, pp. 38ff.
10 Kant agrees with Hume that space and time have to do with the manner in which objects 
or representations are arranged, but for Kant the application of a priori concepts is needed 
in order to bring this arrangement to consciousness. (Cf. Falkenstein, 1990). He would 
argue, then, that an idea that brings together temporally-diverse elements presupposes 
an a priori synthesis under concepts. Hume’s theory, on the above reading, avoids that 
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requirement: if an experience of a succession can consist just in a copy of a succession 
of impressions, then no further synthesis is required.
11 Presentism has been attacked for not being able to account for singular propositions 
about non-present objects or past or future times (such as “Socrates was a philosopher,” 
or “2008 will be a great year for the stock market”). It has also been accused of being 
incompatible with the Special Theory of Relativity, which allegedly rules out the possi-
bility of absolute simultaneity. For a defense of presentism against these concerns, see 
Markosian, 2004.
12 Such questions all presuppose a spatially- and temporally-located perceiver, capable of 
compound perceptions. Hume, of course, famously denies our having knowledge or even 
a coherent idea of such a thing. I can give two answers to this point. First, this just relo-
cates the problem of representing a succession as a succession to the problem of what 
constitutes a set of perceptions as a set belonging to one person rather than to several, 
and Hume does not have an answer to this. Second, our not having knowledge of a 
self doesn’t stop us or Hume from presupposing a continuing self in other contexts any 
more than our not having knowledge of necessary connections stops us from speaking in 
terms of causation. For these reasons I think this kind of question is a fair one, even if on 
Hume’s strict view we are just talking about bundles of perceptions.
13 Barry Dainton defends the notion of something like an extended present of perception 
(Dainton, 2000). His account, however, is strictly phenomenological. Furthermore, the 
topography of his “diachronic co-consciousness” may not be coherent: see Bayne, 2001, 
p. 85. I would reassert in any event my skepticism regarding any view that does not allow 
us to talk in principle about what we are experiencing at a moment.
14 As Falkenstein has suggested in correspondence. It is also his view that Thomas Reid 
maintained a position like this.
15 As discussed in Garrett, p. 55, and in Baxter, 2001. Baxter explains that Hume takes 
steadfast objects to include perceptions, and that he focuses on perceptions rather than 
objects in his discussion of time. I shall, therefore, put the following in terms of steadfast 
perceptions vs. successions of changing perceptions.
16 Further, as Baxter has pointed out in a comment on this paper, it seems that the like-
ness principle requires that a succession of different process-stages be represented by 
different perceptions.
17 Some readers may be wondering whether Husserl’s famous analysis of the phenom-
enology of time-awareness might be employed in support of an empiricist account of 
time-awareness. But, like Kant, Husserl thinks that raw sense-data are subjected to 
conceptualization as a necessary condition of their becoming part of conscious experi-
ence. This is equally true for Husserl when it comes to generating the kind of presenta-
tion of the present, just-past, and the anticipated near-future that he discusses in his 
analysis of time-awareness. See Smith and McIntyre, 1982; cf. Kelly, 2003.
18 I am grateful to Don Baxter, Marina Frasca-Spada, George Graham, and Ralph Kennedy 
for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. Conversations with Sean Kelly on 
related subjects were also helpful; Kelly’s work on time-awareness has infl uenced mine 
in these pages. This paper was presented at the 2004 Atlantic Canada Seminar on Early 
Modern Philosophy, the 2005 APA Central Division meeting of the Philosophy of Time 
Society, and the 2006 Hume Society meeting; I benefi ted from the comments of a number 
of participants at those meetings. I am indebted to two anonymous Hume Studies referees 
for their commentary. Finally, Lorne Falkenstein’s generous and extensive comments on 
two earlier drafts were invaluable and infl uenced many parts of this paper.
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